MSVC++ 64bit Enums

If you want to represent a value larger than 32bits in an enum in MSVC++ you can use C++0x style syntax to tell the compiler exactly what kind of integral type to store the enum values. Unfortunately by default an enum is always 32bits, and additionally while you can specify constants larger than 32bits for the enum values, they are silently truncated to 32bits.

For instance the following doesn't compile because Lorem::a and Lorem::b have the same value of '1':

      enum Lorem {
    a = 0x1,
    b = 0x100000001
} val;

switch (val) {
    case Lorem::a:
        break;
    case Lorem::b:
        break;
}

Unfortunately it is not an error to have b's constant truncated, and the previous without the switch statement does compile just fine:

      enum Lorem {
    a = 0x1,
    b = 0x100000001
} val;

But you can explicitly specify that the enum should be represented by a 64bit value and get expected compiling behavior with the following:

      enum Lorem : UINT64 {
    a = 0x1,
    b = 0x100000001
} val;

switch (val) {
    case Lorem::a:
        break;
    case Lorem::b:
        break;
}

Shout Text Windows 8 App Development Notes

My first app for Windows 8 was Shout Text. You type into Shout Text, and your text is scaled up as large as possible while still fitting on the screen, as you type. It is the closest thing to a Hello World app as you'll find on the Windows Store that doesn't contain that phrase (by default) and I approached it as the simplest app I could make to learn about Windows modern app development and Windows Store app submission.

I rely on WinJS's default layout to use CSS transforms to scale up the user's text as they type. And they are typing into a simple content editable div.

The app was too simple for me to even consider using ads or charging for it which I learned more about in future apps.

The first interesting issue I ran into was that copying from and then pasting into the content editable div resulted in duplicates of the containing div with copied CSS appearing recursively inside of the content editable div. To fix this I had to catch the paste operation and remove the HTML data from the clipboard to ensure only the plain text data is pasted:

        function onPaste() {
            var text;

            if (window.clipboardData) {
                text = window.clipboardData.getData("Text").toString();
                window.clipboardData.clearData("Html");
                window.clipboardData.setData("Text", util.normalizeContentEditableText(text));
            }
        }
        shoutText.addEventListener("beforepaste", function () { return false; }, false);
        shoutText.addEventListener("paste", onPaste, false);

I additionally found an issue in IE in which applying a CSS transform to a content editable div that has focus doesn't move the screen position of the user input caret - the text is scaled up or down but the caret remains the same size and in the same place on the screen. To fix this I made the following hack to reapply the current cursor position and text selection which resets the screen position of the user input caret.

        function resetCaret() {
            setTimeout(function () {
                var cursorPos = document.selection.createRange().duplicate();
                cursorPos.select();
            }, 200);
        }

        shoutText.attachEvent("onresize", function () { resetCaret(); }, true);

Windows Store on Windows 8 Fun For Independent Developers

Having worked on Windows 8 I'm not in a neutral position to review aspects of it, however I'll say from a high level I love taking the following various positives from smart phone apps and app stores and applying it to the desktop:

• Independent developers can easily publish apps.
• One trusted place for a user to find apps.
• User can trust apps are limited to a declared set of capabilities.
• One common and easy way for users to buy and try apps.
• Easy mechanism for independent developers to collect revenue.

Relieving the independent developer of software development overhead, in this case Windows taking care of distribution and sales infrastructure is wonderful for me with my third party developer hat on. This combined with my new found fun of developing in JavaScript and the new Windows Runtime APIs means I've been implementing and finishing various ideas I've had - some for fun and some for productivity on my Surface. Development notes to follow.

Sci-fi short stories disguised as Internet docs

The recent short story Twitter API returning results that do not respect arrow of time by Tim May written as a Twitter bug report reminded me of a few other short sci-fi stories written in the style of some sort of Internet document:

• comp.basalisk FAQ by David Langford written as a FAQ.
• Wikihistory by Desmond Warzel presented as a forum thread.
• The Riddle of the Universe and Its Solution by Christopher Cherian written as a scientific report.

Stripe CTF - Level 8

Level 8 of the Stripe CTF is a password server that returns success: true if and only if the password provided matches the password stored directly via a RESTful API and optionally indirectly via a callback URI. The solution is side channel attack like a timing attack but with ports instead of time.

(I found this in my drafts folder and had intended to post a while ago.)

Code

    def nextServerCallback(self, data):
        parsed_data = json.loads(data)
        # Chunk was wrong!
        if not parsed_data['success']:
            # Defend against timing attacks
            remaining_time = self.expectedRemainingTime()
            self.log_info('Going to wait %s seconds before responding' %
                          remaining_time)
            reactor.callLater(remaining_time, self.sendResult, False)
            return

        self.checkNext()

Issue

The password server breaks the target password into four pieces and stores each on a different server. When a password request is sent to the main server it makes requests to the sub-servers for each part of the password request. It does this in series and if any part fails, then it stops midway through. Password requests may also be made with corresponding URI callbacks and after the server decides on the password makes an HTTP request on the provided URI callbacks saying if the password was success: true or false.
A timing attack looks at how long it took for a password to be rejected and longer times could mean a longer prefix of the password was correct allowing for a directed brute force attack. Timing attacks are prevented in this case by code on the password server that attempts to wait the same amount of time, even if the first sub-server responds with false. However, the server uses sequential outgoing port numbers shared between the requests to the sub-servers and the callback URIs. Accordingly, we can examine the port numbers on our callback URIs to direct a brute force attack.
If the password provided is totally incorrect then the password server will contact one sub-server and then your callback URI. So if you see the remote server's port number go up by two when requesting your callback URI, you know the password is totally incorrect. If by three then you know the first fourth of the password is correct and the rest is incorrect. If by four then two fourths of the password is correct. If by five then four sub-servers were contacted so you need to rely on the actual content of the callback URI request of 'success: true' or 'false' since you can't tell from the port change if the password was totally correct or not.
The trick in the real world is false positives. The port numbers are sequential over the system, so if the password server is the only thing making outgoing requests then its port numbers will also be sequential, however other things on the system can interrupt this. This means that the password server could contact three sub-servers and normally you'd see the port number increase by four, but really it could increase by four or more because of other things running on the system. To counteract this I ran in cycles: brute forcing the first fourth of the password and removing any entry that gets a two port increase and keeping all others. Eventually I could remove all but the correct first fourth of the password. And so on for the next parts of the password.
I wrote my app to brute force this in Python. This was my first time writing Python code so it is not pretty.

Windows Remote Desktop via Internet

To setup my home Windows dev box to be accessible from outside I followed two main steps:

•  Configure my router to forward the remote desktop port.
•  Setup a free dynamic DNS service.

Last time I had to do this there was a service named dynamicdns.org which seems to still exist but no longer appears to be free. Instead I used dnsdynamic.org which is free and has a web API as well as links to and instructions for setting up native tools to dynamically update my IP address.

Stripe CTF - Level 7

Level 7 of the Stripe CTF involved running a length extension attack on the level 7 server's custom crypto code.

Code

@app.route('/logs/<int:id>')
@require_authentication
def logs(id): 
    rows = get_logs(id) 
    return render_template('logs.html', logs=rows) 

...

def verify_signature(user_id, sig, raw_params):
    # get secret token for user_id
    try:
        row = g.db.select_one('users', {'id': user_id})
    except db.NotFound:
        raise BadSignature('no such user_id')
    secret = str(row['secret'])

    h = hashlib.sha1()
    h.update(secret + raw_params)
    print 'computed signature', h.hexdigest(), 'for body', repr(raw_params)
    if h.hexdigest() != sig:
        raise BadSignature('signature does not match')
    return True

Issue

The level 7 web app is a web API in which clients submit signed RESTful requests and some actions are restricted to particular clients. The goal is to view the response to one of the restricted actions. The first issue is that there is a logs path to display the previous requests for a user and although the logs path requires the client to be authenticatd, it doesn't restrict the logs you view to be for the user for which you are authenticated. So you can manually change the number in the '/logs/[#]' to '/logs/1' to view the logs for the user ID 1 who can make restricted requests. The level 7 web app can be exploited with replay attacks but you won't find in the logs any of the restricted requests we need to run for our goal. And we can't just modify the requests because they are signed.

However they are signed using their own custom signing code which can be exploited by a length extension attack. All Merkle–Damgård hash algorithms (which includes MD5, and SHA) have the property that if you hash data of the form (secret + data) where data is known and the length but not content of secret is known you can construct the hash for a new message (secret + data + padding + newdata) where newdata is whatever you like and padding is determined using newdata, data, and the length of secret. You can find a sha-padding.py script on VNSecurity blog that will tell you the new hash and padding per the above. With that I produced my new restricted request based on another user's previous request. The original request was the following.

count=10&lat=37.351&user_id=1&long=%2D119.827&waffle=eggo|sig:8dbd9dfa60ef3964b1ee0785a68760af8658048c

The new request with padding and my new content was the following.

count=10&lat=37.351&user_id=1&long=%2D119.827&waffle=eggo%80%02%28&waffle=liege|sig:8dbd9dfa60ef3964b1ee0785a68760af8658048c

My new data in the new request is able to overwrite the waffle parameter because their parser fills in a map without checking if the parameter existed previously.

Notes

Code review red flags included custom crypto looking code. However I am not a crypto expert and it was difficult for me to find the solution to this level.